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White: Attorney Conduct

NOTE

STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISCIPLINE v.
YAGMAN: THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROVIDES
SUBSTANTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY CRITICISM
OF THE JUDICIARY

I. INTRODUCTION
In Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California v. Yagman,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an attorney who
publicly criticized a federal judge did not commit sanctionable
conduct. l In determining whether the attorney, Stephen
Yagman, had violated a local rule of professional conduct for
lawyers, the court applied a "reasonable attorney" standard,
rather than a subjective malice standard. 2 The court held that
Yagman's statements, in light of this higher standard, did not
violate the rule's prohibition against impugning the integrity of
the court. 3 The Ninth Circuit also held that the attorney's
statements did not violate the rule's prohibition against attorneys interfering with the administration of justice. 4 In finding
no interference with the administration of justice the Ninth
Circuit announced a new standard. Under this new standard
the attorney's conduct must pose a "clear and present danger"

1. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter "Yagman") (opinion
by Kozinski, J., joined by Thompson, J.; dissent by Wiggins, J.).
2. See id. at 1437; see infra text accompanying notes 66-71.
3. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438-42.
4. Id. at 1445.
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to the administration of justice to be sanctionable. 5 This note
examines the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Yagman's statements
and questions whether the newly-created "clear and present
danger" standard is stringent enough to prevent attorneys
from forum shopping. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the holding of the district court.s
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1991, Los Angeles-based civil rights attorney Stephen
Yagman filed a lawsuit in which he was the party plaintiff
against several insurance companies. 7 The case was assigned
to Judge Manuel Real, who was Chief Judge of the Central
District of California at that time. s Yagman subsequently filed
a motion to disqualify Judge Real on grounds of bias. 9 The
motion was randomly assigned to Judge William Keller.lO
Judge Keller denied the motion l l and issued an Order to
Show Cause why Yagman should not be sanctioned for failing
to notify the judge that another court had previously rejected
an attempt by Yagman to disqualify Judge Real. 12 On May 31,
1991, Judge Keller filed an order in which he found Yagman in

5. Id. at 1443.
6. Id. at 1445.

7. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (hereinafter "Standing Comm."); Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1433.
9. Id. Yagman based his claim of bias on an earlier case in which Judge Real
granted a directed verdict for Yagman's opponents and sanctioned Yagman personally in the amount of $250,000. Id. at 1434 n.1. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
sanctions and remanded the case for assignment to another judge. Id. (citing In re
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1188 (9th Cir. 1986)). The court found no evidence that
Judge Real held any personal animosity toward Yagman, but reassigned the case
"to preserve the appearance of justice." Id. On remand, Judge Real challenged the
Ninth Circuit's authority to reassign the case. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.1.
Yagman then petitioned for, and was granted, a writ of mandamus. The dispute
came to an end when the U.S. Supreme Court denied Judge Real's petition for
certiorari. Id. (citing Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987)).
10. Id. at 1433-34 (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 652, 657-58
(C.D. Cal. 1991)).
11. Id. On appeal, Judge Keller's denial of the disqualification order was affirmed. Id. at 1434 n.2 (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.
1993)).
12. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385.
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violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11/3 18 U.S.C.
section 401(3)14 and the inherent authority of the COurt. 15
A week after Judge Keller issued his sanctions order, the
Los Angeles Daily Journal quoted Yagman as stating that
Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers:
me, David Kenner and Hugh Manes. I find this to be evidence
of anti-Semitism."16 The district court also found that Yagman
accused Judged Keller of being "drunk on the bench," although
the Daily Journal article did not publish this charge. 17
Around the time that the Daily Journal published the
article, Prentice Hall, publisher of the Almanac of the Federal
Judiciary, requested comments from Yagman for a profile of

13. Id. (citing Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1991». As a basis for
the recusal motion, Yagman relied on Real v. Yagman, characterized in his moving
papers as a case in which "Judge Real sued me personally." Republic Insurance,
137 F.R.D. at 314. Judge Keller found this characterization to be "grossly negligent." Id. The judge held that Yagman's attempt to use that case as a basis for
recusal was not "to the best of Yagman's knowledge, information and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry, well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law or good faith extension thereof," in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11.Id.
14. The statute reads: "A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and
none other, as . . . (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. § 40l.
15. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385. In the sanctions order, Judge
Keller stated that Yagman was being sanctioned for pursuing the matter in an
"improper and frivolous manner." Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. at 312. The order
sharply reprimanded Yagman, further stating that "neither monetary sanctions nor
suspension appear to be effective in deterring Yagman's pestiferous conduct."
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.2 (citing Republic Insurance, 137 F.R.D. at 318). The
order also recommended that Yagman be "disciplined appropriately" by the California State Bar. Id. (citing Republic Insurance, 137 F.R.D. at 319). On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the sanctions but affirmed the denial of the disqualification.
Id. (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993».
16. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 (citing Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman,
Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, June 6, 1991, at 1).
17. Id. at 1434 (citing Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386).
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Judge Keller. is Yagman responded with a letter to Prentice
Hall in which he offered scathing criticism of the judge. 19
In June of 1991, Yagman's law firm placed a half-page
advertisement in the Los Angeles Daily Journal asking attorneys who had been sanctioned by Judge Keller to contact the
law firm.20 Approximately a month and a half later, Yagman
spoke with attorney Robert Steinberg in a Los Angeles courthouse hallway.2i The district court panel believed Steinberg's
claim that, at this time, Yagman told Steinberg that he publicly criticized Judge Keller in hopes of getting the judge to recuse himself in future cases. 22 Steinberg, believing Yagman

18. Id. at 1434. The Almanac profiles federal judges, covering their backgrounds, noteworthy rulings and other items of interest. Id. at 1434 n.3. One
section titled "Lawyers' Evaluation" publishes anonymous attorneys' comments
which sometimes contain harsh criticism. Judges who believe the comments published in the "Lawyers' Evaluation" do not fairly represent their performance on
the bench sometimes ask Prentice Hall to elicit additional comments from attorneys. Prentice Hall sent a letter to Yagman following such a request from Judge
Keller. Id.
19. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386. In his letter, Yagman claimed
that Judge Keller had sanctioned or sought to sanction three Jewish attorneys,
including Yagman. Id. The letter further stated:
It is outrageous that the Judge wants his profile redone
because he thinks it to be inaccurately harsh in portraying him in a poor light. It is an understatement to characterize the judge as "the worst judge in the central district." It would be fairer to say that he is ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a bully, and probably is one of
the worst judges in the United States. If television cameras were permitted in his courtroom, the other federal
judges in the country would be so embarrassed by this
buffoon that they would run for cover. One might believe
that some of the reason for this sub-standard human is
the recent acrimonious divorce through which he recently
went: but talking to attorneys who knew him years ago
indicates that, if anything, he has mellowed. One other
comment: his girlfriend is, or was, the newly-appointed
U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Lourdes Baird, who, like
the judge, is a right wing fanatic.
Id. The district court also found that Yagman sent a copy of the letter to Judge
Keller. Id.
20. Id. The advertisement read: "This office is gathering evidence concerning
sanctions imposed by U.S. Dist. Judge William D. Keller. It would be appreciated
if any attorney who has been sanctioned, or threatened with sanctions by Judge
Keller fill out the form below and mail it to us. Thank you." Yagman, 55 F.3d at
1434 n.5.
21. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1386-87.
22. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434; See also Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1392.
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had committed misconduct, wrote a letter to the Standing
Committee on Discipline which described his conversation with
Yagman. 23
In September of 1991, Judge Keller wrote a letter to the
Standing Committee which formally referred Yagman's conduct
for disciplinary action, pursuant to the local rules of attorney
professional conduct. 24 The letter described Yagman's antiSemitism charge, the comments he made to Prentice Hall publishing, and Yagman's firm's advertisement in the Los Angeles
Daily Journal. 25
The Standing Committee investigated the charges described by Steinberg and Judge Keller, and, in October of 1992,
filed a Petition for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause why
Yagman should not be suspended from practice or otherwise
disciplined under Local Rule 2.6.4. 26 Pursuant to this rule, the
matter was assigned to a panel of three Central District judg-

Yagman strongly denied saying this to Steinberg. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.6.
23. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434.
24. Id. at 1435. Federal Local Court Rule for the Central District of California
(Civil) section 2.6.3.1 provides, in pertinent part:
Role of the Standing Committee on Discipline. The Standing Committee on Discipline shall investigate any charge
or information, whether referred by one of the judges or
otherwise coming to its attention, that any attorney has
been guilty of unprofessional conduct or has violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.
Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.3.1
25. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435. In his letter, Judge Keller stated:
Mr. Yagman's campaign of harassment and intimidation
challenges the integrity of the judicial system. Moreover,
there is clear evidence that Mr. Yagman's attacks upon
me are motivated by his desire to create a basis for recusing me in any future proceeding. . . . The Standing
Committee on Discipline should take action to protect the
court from further abuse.
Id.
26. Id.
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es. 27 The panel subsequently reissued an Order to Show
Cause and scheduled a hearing on the matter.2S
The hearing lasted two days, during which time both the
Standing Committee and Yagman presented evidence. 29 After
reviewing the evidence and the written arguments of the parties, the panel found that Yagman violated two separate prohibitions of Local Rule 2.5.2.30 First, the panel held that certain
of Yagman's criticisms constituted conduct which "degrades or
impugns the integrity of the Court."31 Second, it found that
Yagman violated the Rule's prohibition against "engag[ing] in
any conduct . . . which interferes with the administration of
justice.,,32 After reviewing arguments regarding the appropriate sanction, the panel suspended Yagman from practice before
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California for a period of two years.33 Yagman appealed the
panel's decision to the Ninth Circuit.34
III. BACKGROUND

A. THE POLICY BEHIND REGULATING ATTORNEY SPEECH
Regulation of attorney criticisms directed at the judiciary
necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns. 35 Because a

27. 1d. Chief Judge Real originally referred the matter to Chief Circuit Judge
Clifford J. Wallace for assignment to a panel of three judges from outside the
Central District. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387. After Yagman argued
that this assignment violated Local Rule 2.6.4, the matter was referred back to
Chief Judge Real, who assigned it to Central District Judges Rafeedie, Davies and
Williams. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 n.7.
28. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387.
29. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435. Prior to the hearing, and on appeal, Yagman
made several objections to the district court proceedings. First, he raised First
Amendment objections to being disciplined for his statements regarding Judge
Keller. Though both sides requested the opportunity to brief the issue, the panel
did not act on these requests. The parties were thus forced to proceed without
knowing the allocation of the burden of proof or the legal standard the court intended to use. 1d.
30. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1385.
31. 1d.
32. 1d.
33. 1d. at 1400.
34. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1433.
35. See id. at 1437-38, referring to Oklahoma ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 966 (Okla. 1988).
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major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs,36 regulation of criticism
which is directed at a governmental unit strikes at the center
of First Amendment freedoms. 37 In addition to the speaker's
right to communicate, the First Amendment inquiry takes into
account the right of the listener to receive information. 3s Foreclosing an individual's right to hear an attorney's criticism of
the judiciary prevents the public from receiving information on
the judicial process from those who are intimately familiar
with this branch of government. 39
Weighed against the attorney's right to criticize the judiciary is the societal interest in maintaining public confidence
in the judicial system:o In United States District Court v.
Sandlin,'u the Ninth Circuit struck a constitutionally permissible balance between these competing interests by holding
that attorneys may freely criticize the judiciary if these criticisms are supported by a reasonable factual basis.42 So long
as these criticisms have such support, an attorney who voices
them will not be subject to sanctions, even if the attorney is
mistaken. 43
B. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

District courts possess the inherent power to discipline
attorneys for unprofessional conduct in federal court.44 The
standards of professional conduct for attorneys practicing in
the Central District of California are set forth in the Federal
Local Court Rules. 45 The Central District provides a proce36. See Porter, 766 P.2d at 966-67.
37.Id.
38. Id. at 967.
39. Id.
40. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).
41. 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993).
42. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
43.Id.
44. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (C.D. Cal 1994) (citing In re Yagman,
803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986) and Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist.
Court for the Southern Dist. of Cal. v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1081 (1984».
45. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1387 (referring to Local Rules 2.5, 2.5.1
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dure by which judges and others in the legal community may
refer unprofessional conduct to the Standing Committee on
Discipline for investigation. 46 If the Committee determines
that the conduct merits discipline, it petitions for an Order to
Show Cause why the attorney should not be subject to sanctions. 47 The case is then assigned to a panel of three judges,
which holds a hearing in which the Committee acts as prosecutor.48
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Standing Committee v. Yagman,49 the Ninth Circuit
first rejected Yagman's contention that the composition of the
Standing Committee denied him due process. 50 The court further held that his statements did not violate the prohibition
contained in Local Rule 2.5.2, which bars statements that
impugn the integrity of the court.51 The court also found that
Yagman's conduct did not violate the rule's prohibition against
interfering with the administration of justice.52 In determining whether Yagman violated either of the local rule's prohibitions, the Ninth Circuit applied an objective "reasonable attorney" standard, rather than the subjective malice standard
typically used in defamation actions. 53

and 2.5.2.).
46. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 (citing Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.1
and 2.6.3). The Standing Committee consists of twelve attorneys who are members
of the bar of the court. Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.1. The Committee is
divided into four sections. Id. at 2.6.3.2. When a charge is referred to the Committee, the chair assigns a section to investigate the matter. At the conclusion of the
investigation, the section makes a recommendation to the Committee regarding
whether the attorney's conduct merits sanctions. The full Committee may approve
the recommendation by a majority vote or take other action it deems advisable,
also by a majority vote. Id. at 2.6.3.3.
47.Id.
48. See Fed Local Ct Rules, CD Cal Rule 2.6.4.
49. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
50. See id. at 1436.
51. See id. at 1437-42.
52. Id. at 1445.
53. See id. at 1437.
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THE MAKEUP OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Yagman challenged the
composition of the Standing Committee. 54 He claimed that
several of its members had conflicts of interest that could have
affected their decisions to seek disciplinary action against
him. 55 However, the court quickly rejected this due process
claim, noting that none of the Standing Committee members
represented Judge Keller, nor did the judge stand to benefit
from any disciplinary action taken against Yagman. 56 Absent
a conflict of interest, the court found no other support for
Yagman's due process claim. 57
B.

STATEMENTS WHICH IMPUGN THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT

In determining that Yagman's statements were protected
by the First Amendment, the court first discussed the validity
of Local Rule 2.5.2 and the legal standard to be used in deciding whether Yagman's statements were sanctionable. 58 In discussing the prohibition in Local Rule 2.5.2 against conduct
which "impugns the integrity of the court," the Ninth Circuit
relied on its opinion in Lewis v. Time, Inc. 59 The Lewis court
held that the First Amendment protects statements of opinion
unless they imply a false assertion of fact.60 Applying Lewis,
54. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435.
55. Id. The Chairman of the Standing Committee represented Judge Real in
Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987) and was alleged by Yagman to have close
personal ties to Judge Real. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1435 n.9. Yagman also claimed
that several of the other Committee members had opposed his clients in previous
actions, either as defendants or opposing counsel. Id.
56. Id. at 1436.
57. Id. The court noted that the function of the Standing Committee is merely
to assist the district court in upholding attorney disciplinary standards by relieving judges of the ungainly task of acting as both arbiters and prosecutors in disciplinary proceedings; the Standing Committee itself has no authority to impose
sanctions. Id. In addition, the fact that the members of the Standing Committee
are drawn from the Central District bar reflected a constitutionally sound judgement that the benefits of having the prosecutorial body composed of peers of the
attorney outweighs any potential loss of independence resulting from the Committee members' familiarity with the attorney subject to the proceedings. Yagman, 55
F.3d at 1436 n.ll.
58. See id. at 1436-38.
59. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555
(9th Cir. 1983».
60. Id. (citing Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555 and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
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the court concluded that statements capable of being proved
true or false which impugn the integrity of a judge may be the
basis for sanctions. 61 However, if the statements express an
opinion based on fully stated facts they receive First Amendment protection, so long as the facts themselves are not false
or demeaning. 62
1. Overbreadth of the Local Rule
The Ninth Circuit concurred with the district court's determination that a portion of Local Rule 2.5.2 is overbroad. 63 The
district court reasoned that the rule's prohibition against conduct "which impugns the integrity of the court" proscribes
much constitutionally protected speech.54 The Ninth Circuit
also affirmed the district court's holding that an attorney may
be sanctioned for impugning the integrity of a court only if the
rule can be given a limiting construction. 65
To save this portion of Rule 2.5.2, the district court read
into it an "objective" version of the malice standard. 66 This
standard was originally set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 67 Relying on this "objective"
standard, first applied by the Ninth Circuit in United States
District Court v. Sandlin,68 the district court held Rule 2.5.2
u.s.

1, 19 (1990»; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) which
asserts that a statement of opinion is only actionable if it implies the existence of
undisclosed defamatory facts. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
61. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
62. See id. at 1439; See also Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555.
63. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1436-37.
64. [d. The court noted that the rule purports to punish even true statements
that reflect poorly on the integrity of a judge. [d.
65. [d.; Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The Ninth
Circuit stated that a substantially overbroad restriction on protected speech is
invalid unless it is "fairly subject to a limiting construction." Yagman, 55 F.3d at
1437 (quoting Board of Airport Commr's v. Jews For Jesus Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577
(1987)).
66. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan the Supreme Court held that a subjective
standard would be used in defamation cases to determine whether the speaker
acted with "actual malice", which is defined as having knowledge that his statement was false or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.
See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1389-90.
68. 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993) (cited in Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437).
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to prohibit only false statements made with either knowledge
of their falsity or statements made with reckless disregard as
to their truth or falsity, as judged from the perspective of a
"reasonable attorney.,,69
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected
Yagman's contention that the New York Times "subjective"
malice standard should apply in attorney disciplinary proceedings. 70 Citing Sandlin, the Ninth Circuit noted that because
the interests served in defamation actions are different from
those served by the rules of professional ethics, the "objective
standard" applies in attorney disciplinary proceedings.71
The Ninth Circuit also outlined other First Amendment
protections ordinarily applicable in defamation actions that are
available to attorneys accused of making statements which
impugn the integrity of a court.72 The court noted that truth
is a defense to sanctions imposed for violating this rule. 73 In
addition, sanctionable statements must be capable of being
proved true or false. 74 Thus, the First Amendment protects
statements of opinion unless they "imply a false assertion of
fact."75 Guided by these principles, the court determined
69. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (citing Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 138990). Under this inquiry, the court must determine what a reasonable attorney
would do in similar circumstances. Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867. The inquiry focuses
on whether the attorney possessed a reasonable factual basis for making the statements, taking into account their nature and the context in which they were made.
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (citing Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867).
70. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1390; see also Yagman, 55 F.3d at
1437.
71. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-38. Defamation seeks to remedy a private
wrong to an individual's reputation by compensating that person. [d. at 1437.
Unlike defamation law, ethical standards proscribing false statements which impugn the integrity of a court are designed to maintain public confidence in the
judicial system, rather than shield its judges from harsh criticism or compensate
them in any way. [d. at 1438. In analyzing Sandlin, the Ninth Circuit in Yagman
found that the objective standard maintained a constitutionally permissible balance
between the right of attorneys to criticize judges and the public interest in preserving confidence in the judicial system. [d.
72. See id. at 1438.
73. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964)). In addition, the disciplinary body bears the burden of proving the statement false. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) and Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988)).
74. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
75. [d. (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (1990); Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555; and
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whether the statements attributed to Yagman impugned the
integrity of the court.
2. Accusation of Anti-Semitism
The Ninth Circuit first considered Yagman's statement in
the Daily Journal accusing Judge Keller of anti-Semitism. 76
Though the district court concluded that this statement was
entirely an assertion of fact, the Ninth Circuit viewed it as
both an assertion of fact and an expression of opinion. 77 An
opinion based on fully disclosed facts will be sanctioned only if
the stated facts themselves are false and demeaning. 78 Because the Committee did not claim that Yagman's factual assertion was false, and because Yagman disclosed the basis for
his view that Judge Keller is anti-Semitic, the Ninth Circuit
found his remark to be protected by the First Amendment as
an expression of opinion based on fully stated facts. 79
3. Accusation of Dishonesty
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's determination that Yagman's allegation of Judge Keller's "dishonesty" was sanctionable. 80 For such a statement to be the sub-

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977». The court also noted that statements which cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about their
subject are not sanctionable, even though they might initially appear to be factual
assertions. [d. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). In
Hustler the Supreme Court rejected a libel claim filed by a nationally known
minister's against a magazine. The claim arose from the publication of an advertisement "parody" which, among other things, portrayed the minister as having a
drunken, incestuous encounter with his mother in a outhouse. Hustler, 485 U.S. 46
(1988». The court affirmed a jury verdict which found that the parody could not
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about the minister. [d. at 57.
76. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. See also supra text accompanying note 16.
77. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
78. [d. at 1439 (citing Lewis, 710 F.2d 549, 555-56 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566, cmt. c). The court explained the rationale behind this rule:
"When the facts forming the basis of an opinion are disclosed, the readers will
understand that they are getting the author's interpretation of the facts and,
therefore, will not likely assume the statement is based on additional, undisclosed
facts." [d. at 1439 (citing Phantom Touring Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d
724, 730 (1st Cir. 1992) and Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555».
79. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1440.
80. [d. at 1441.
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ject of sanctions, it must first be capable of being proved true
or false. 81 The district court found that the statement "contain[edl provably false factual connotations ... and plainly
impl[ied] past improprieties."82 However, the Ninth Circuit
held that, when considered in context with the other statements, his remarks could only be understood as "rhetorical
hyperbole.,,83 The Ninth Circuit found that, because Yagman's
allegation of dishonesty did not imply facts capable of verification, it was protected by the First Amendment as a statement
of opinion. 84
4. Accusation Of Drunkenness
The Ninth Circuit noted that, unlike the string of colorful
terms Yagman used to describe Judge Keller in the Prentice
Hall letter, the accusation that the judge was "drunk on the
bench" was not protected as a statement of rhetorical hyperbole because it implied facts capable of objective verification. 85
However, for the accusation to serve as a basis for sanctions,
the Standing Committee was required to prove that the statement was false, which it failed to do. 86 Without proof of falsity, the court held that Yagman's accusation of drunkenness
could not support a sanction for impugning the integrity of the
court. 87
81. Id. at 1438 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19).
82. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1391.
83. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1440. Yagman used a string of harsh terms to describe Judge Keller. See supra note 19.
84. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit
believed the accusation could not reasonably be interpreted as accusing Judge
Keller of criminal misconduct. Id. at 1440. At most, the appellate court thought
the accusation could be construed to imply that the judge was "intellectually dishonest," that is, Yagman might have been accusing Judge Keller of making rulings
which were overly result-oriented. Id. at 1441. The court stated that such an allegation of "intellectual dishonesty" could not be proved true or false by reference to
a "core of objective evidence," and is thus not sanctionable. Id. (citing Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 21).
85. See id. at 1441. See supra note 19 for the text of the letter. The statement was not part of the letter to Prentice Hall, but was a remark allegedly
made to a newspaper reporter. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441. The court also found
nothing that took away from the literal meaning of the words used by Yagman.
Id. The court held that the statement could reasonably be interpreted to imply
that Judge Keller had taken the bench at least once while he was intoxicated. Id.
86. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court improperly shifted the
burden of proof on this issue to Yagman. Id. at 1441 n.21.
87. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441-42 (citing Oklahoma ex rei. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n
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C. CONDUCT WHICH INTERFERES WITH THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE

The district court found that Yagman's statements interfered with the administration of justice because they were
made in an attempt to cause Judge Keller to recuse himself
from cases in which Yagman appeared as counsel. 88 In reaching its conclusion, the district court focused on Yagman's intent
in making the statements. 89 However, the Ninth Circuit did
not consider Yagman's intent to ''judge shop" sufficient to support a sanction. 90 In reversing the sanction for interfering
with the administration of justice the court instead focused on
the likelihood that Yagman's conduct would actually prejudice
the administration of justice, rather than on his purpose in
making the statements. 91
1. A New Standard
To determine whether the likelihood of Judge Keller's
voluntary recusal was great enough to warrant sanctions, the
Ninth Circuit had to decide what standard should be used to
measure this probability.92 The court relied on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada 93 to resolve this issue. 94 Gentile held that speech otherwise entitled to constitutional protection may be prohibited if
it obstructs or prejudices the administration of justice. 95 To
determine the likelihood that an attorney's statements will
prejudice a court proceeding, the Gentile Court rejected using a
"clear and present danger standard."96 Instead, the Court
chose a lower standard, holding that lawyers involved in pending cases may be punished if their statements pose a "substan-

v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988».
88. See Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1392.
89.Id.
90. Id. at 1442-44.
91. Id. at 1442.
92. Id. at 1442-44.
93. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
94. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1442-43.
95. Id. at 1442 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75; see also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966».
96. [d. at 1442 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075).
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tial likelihood" of materially prejudicing the fairness of the
proceeding. 97
Although the Ninth Circuit examined the reasoning of
Gentile in the present case, it found the special considerations
present in Gentile to be of limited concern in Yagman's situation, since no case was pending before the court. 98 Of these
considerations, the Gentile Court focused most strongly on the
"fair trial rights of litigants.'>99 As there was no case before
the court and thus no jury venire to prejudice, such rights were
of little concern in Yagman's case. lOO
The Ninth Circuit also noted that speech restrictions not
limited in duration by a particular trial may go far beyond
postponing otherwise protected speech, as they may permanently inhibit any criticism of judges, regardless of whether
the criticism is true or false. lol Due to the absence of these
considerations, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the "substantial likelihood" standard would be unnecessarily restrictive in
the present case. 102 Upon rejecting the "substantial likelihood" test, the Ninth Circuit applied a new standard by holding that the "clear and present danger" test is applicable to
attorney statements if no case is pending before the court. 103
2. The "Clear and Present Danger" Standard
Under the Ninth Circuit's new standard, an attorney's
statements unrelated to a case pending before the court may
only be sanctioned if they pose a clear and present danger to

97.Id.
98. Id. at 1443.
99. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443 (citing Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1068). The Gentile
court was particularly concerned with the effect of extrajudicial statements on
potential jurors. Id.
100. Id. at 1443.
101. Id.
102. Id. "Much speech of public importance - such as testimony at congressional
hearings regarding the temperament and competence of judicial nominees - would
be permanently chilled if the rule in Gentile were extended beyond the confines of
the pending matter.n Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443.
103. Id. The court found accord in In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (N.J. 1982).
Id.
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the court's administration of justice. 104 The Ninth Circuit noted that even the probability of harm does not amount to a
clear and present danger;105 the "substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence must be extremely high before utterances can be punished."106 The court observed that established precedent has held criticisms such as
Yagman's to be insufficient to force the recusal of the judge at
which it was aimed. 107 The majority noted: "Criticism from a
party's attorney creates an even remoter danger that a judge
will disqualify himself because the federal recusal statutes, in
all but the most extreme circumstances, require a showing that
the judge is (or appears to be) biased or prejudiced against a
party, not counsel.,,108 The court also noted that public criticism of judges is not uncommon and does not often lead to the
judge's recusal. 109 Federal judges have been granted life tenure to shield them from the pressure of such criticisms. 110
These factors led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Yagman
did not interfere with the administration of justice because any
possibility that Yagman's statements would cause Judge Keller
to recuse himself in future cases involving Yagman did not
amount to a clear and present danger to the proper functioning
of the courts. III Because his statements did not pose such a
danger, Yagman could not be sanctioned for interfering with
the administration of justice. 112

104. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443.
105. Id. at 1444 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
106. Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941».
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985». See
also In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir. 1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock,
722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir. 1983). Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444.
109. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444. The court also noted that Judge Real did not
recuse himself in Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 652 (C.D. Cal. 1991), despite being the target of harsh criticism by Yagman. Id. at 1444-45.
110. Id. (citing In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 846 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)).
111. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that after
Yagman made the remarks at issue Judge Keller did recuse himself from a subsequent case in which Yagman was involved. Although the judge stated that his
recusal was based on the fact that he had referred Yagman for discipline rather
than Yagman's criticism itself, the court found the basis for recusal beside the
point. Instead the majority's analysis "focuse[dl on objective probabilities: the extent to which the statements in question would be likely to cause a judge of average fortitude to disqualify himself." [d. at n.25.
112. [d.
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CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit applied a new standard in Standing
Committee v. Yagman 113 by holding that an attorney's statements unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be
punished only if they pose a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice. 114 An examination of Yagman's past
experiences concerning the recusal of judges before whom he
has appeared casts doubt on whether the clear and present
danger standard is low enough to prevent attorneys from improperly influencing the justice system. 115
In September 1981, Yagman simultaneously filed five
substantially similar complaints in the Central District of
California and dismissed four of them within 73 minutes after
they had been assigned to judges. lIS The Standing Committee
pursued disciplinary action which was resolved by a stipulated
settlement. ll7 The settlement provided that Yagman would be
suspended from the practice of law for one month, pay a $500
fine and perform twenty-five hours of pro bono service. 118
Following the settlement, Yagman represented the plaintiff in a civil rights case before Judge Harry L. Hupp.1l9 Mer
the jury rendered a verdict for the defense, Yagman immediately filed a new action charging the defendants and their
lawyers with racketeering, mail fraud and obstruction of justice. 120 The action also alleged that Judge Hupp conspired
with the defendants and their counsel to obstruct justice. 121 A

113. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1443 accord, In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (N.J. 1982).
115. See Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1392-1394 (C.D. Cal. 1994) and infra
text accompanying notes 121-33.
116. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1393.
117. Id. The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit filing frivolous or non-meritorious claims and contentions. See, e.g. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1994).
118. Id. Yagman admitted he had committed acts in violation of Local Rule 2.
Id.
119. Id.
120. Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. at 1393.
121. Id.
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motion to dismiss was granted, but Judge Hupp recused himself from all post-trial proceedings and has since declined to
hear any case in which Yagman represents a party.122

In addition to Judge Hupp's recusal, approximately one
year after the decision, the Ninth Circuit removed Chief Judge
Manuel Real from a case involving Yagman. 123 The appellate
court issued the recusal order after Yagman criticized the
judge and accused him of bias. 124 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that Judge Keller did disqualify himself from
one of Yagman's cases after the criticisms in the present case
were made. 125
Given this history, it appears that under the clear and
present danger standard, an attorney may still force the
recusal of a judge, so long as the judge does not recuse himself
immediately after the statement is made. 126 But even under
the clear and present danger standard, Yagman's statements
should be sanctionable, since in the cases involving Judge
Real, Judge Hupp and even Judge Keller, Yagman's accusations either directly or indirectly forced their recusal from
future proceedings. 127 Considering Yagman's record with the
recusal of judges, it appears likely that his allegations of bias
pose a clear and present danger to the administration of justice
even if no matter is pending before the court. 128

122. [d. (citing Hupp Declaration, September 20, 1993, at 2).
123. [d. at 1393.
124. [d. The circumstances of the removal are discussed in more detail in Facts
and Procedural History. See supra text accompanying note 9. Yagman also issued
a statement to the press which stated that the judge "consistently has been held
in the lowest regard by virtually the entire legal community since he took the
bench," and accused him of suffering from "mental disorders". Standing Comm.,
856 F. Supp. at 1394.
125. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445 n.25. However, Judge Keller stated that his
recusal was motivated by the fact that he had referred Yagman for disciplinary
action. [d.
126. See generally id.
127. See id. at 1445; See also Standing Comm., 856 F. Supp. 1393-94.
128. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444-45 for the court's discussion of the clear and
present danger standard as it applied to Yagman's statements.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Standing Committee v. Yagman/ 29 the Ninth Circuit
held that an attorney's criticisms of a judge were statements of
opinion which are protected by the First Amendment. 13o The
court found that, taken together, Yagman's calling Judge William Keller a ''buffoon,'' a "sub-standard human" and "dishonest" can only be viewed as rhetorical hyperbole, and thus prove
nothing more substantive than Yagman's contempt for the
judge. 131 However, the Ninth Circuit did not view his accusation of anti-Semitism as rhetorical hyperbole, but as an assertion of both fact and opinion. 132 The court held this assertion
to be protected by the First Amendment because Yagman had
stated the facts on which he based his opinion. 133 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit did not view Yagman's accusation that Judge
Keller was "drunk on the bench" as rhetorical hyperbole, because it implied facts capable of objective verification. l34 However, because the Standing Committee failed to prove the
statement false, a sanction for "impugning the integrity of the
court" could not stand. 135
The Ninth Circuit also reversed a sanction for "interfering
with the administration of justice."136 In reaching this conclusion, the court announced a new application of an old standard: "[l]awyers' statements unrelated to a matter pending
before the court may be sanctioned only if they pose a clear
and present danger to the administration of justice.,,137 Ap-

129.
of Cal.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1437-42.
[d. at 1440.
[d. at 1438.
[d. at 1440.
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441.
[d. at 1441-42.
[d. at 1445.
[d. at 1443.
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plying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
probability of this danger occurring did not reach the level of
"clear and present."138 Therefore, attorney sanctions were inappropriate. 139
Jeffrey A. White·

138. See id. at 1444.
139. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1444-45.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997.
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